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An Artificial Immune System Approach
with Secondary Response
for Misbehavior Detection in Mobile Ad-Hoc
Networks
Slavisˇa Sarafijanovic´ and Jean-Yves Le Boudec
Abstract In mobile ad-hoc networks, nodes act both as
terminals and information relays, and participate in a common
routing protocol, such as Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). The
network is vulnerable to routing misbehavior, due to faulty or
malicious nodes. Misbehavior detection systems aim at removing
this vulnerability. In this paper we investigate the use of an
Articial Immune System (AIS) to detect node misbehavior in
a mobile ad-hoc network using DSR. The system is inspired by
the natural immune system of vertebrates. Our goal is to build
a system that, like its natural counterpart, automatically learns
and detects new misbehavior. We describe our solution for the
classication task of the AIS; it employs negative selection and
clonal selection, the algorithms for learning and adaptation used
by the natural immune system. We dene how we map the natural
immune system concepts such as self, antigen and antibody to
a mobile ad-hoc network, and give the resulting algorithm for
classifying nodes as misbehaving. We implemented the system in
the network simulator Glomosim; we present detection results
and discuss how the system parameters impact the performance
of primary and secondary response. Further steps will extend the
design by using an analogy to the innate system, danger signal
and memory cells.
Index Terms Mobile, ad-hoc, misbehavior, detection, arti-
cial, immune, clonal selection, learning, adaptive.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Problem Statement: Detecting Misbehaving Nodes in DSR
Mobile ad-hoc networks are self organized networks without
any infrastructure other than end user terminals equipped
with radios. Communication beyond the transmission range
is made possible by having all nodes act both as terminals
and information relays. This in turn requires that all nodes
participate in a common routing protocol, such as Dynamic
Source Routing (DSR) [17]. A problem is that DSR works
well only if all nodes execute the protocol correctly, which is
difcult to guarantee in an open ad-hoc environment.
A possible reason for node misbehavior is faulty software or
hardware. In classical (non ad-hoc) networks run by operators,
equipment malfunction is known to be an important source
of unavailability [18]. In an ad-hoc network, where routing is
performed by user provided equipment, we expect the problem
to be exacerbated. Another reason for misbehavior stems from
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the desire to save battery power: some nodes may run a
modied code that pretends to participate in DSR but, for
example, does not forward packets. Last, some nodes may
also be truly malicious and attempt to bring the network down,
as do Internet viruses and worms. An extensive list of such
misbehavior is given in [3]. The main operation of DSR is
described in Section II-A. In our simulation, we implement
faulty nodes that, from time to time, do not forward data or
route requests, or do not respond to route requests from their
own cache.
We consider the problem of detecting nodes that do not
correctly execute the DSR protocol. The actions taken after
detecting that a node misbehaves range from forbidding to
use the node as a relay [1] to excluding the node entirely
from any participation in the network [3]. In this paper we
focus on the detection of misbehavior and do not discuss the
details of actions taken after detection.
However, the actions do impact the detection function
through the need for a secondary response. Indeed, after a
node is disconnected (boycotted) because it was classied as
misbehaving, it becomes non-observable. Since the protection
system is likely to be adaptive , the ‘punishment fades out and
redemption is allowed [2]. As a result, a misbehaving node is
likely to misbehave again, unless it is xed, for example by a
software upgrade. We call primary [resp. secondary ] response
the classication of a node that misbehaves for the rst [resp.
second or more] time; thus we need to provide a secondary
response that is much faster than primary response.
We chose DSR as a concrete example, because it is one
of the protocols being considered for standardization for
mobile ad-hoc networks. There are other routing protocols, and
there are parts of mobile ad-hoc networks other than routing
that need misbehavior detection, for example medium access
control protocols. We believe the main elements of our method
would also apply there, but a detailed analysis is for further
work.
B. Traditional Misbehavior Detection Approaches
Traditional approaches to misbehavior detection [1], [3] use
the knowledge of anticipated misbehavior patterns and detect
them by looking for specic sequences of events. This is very
efcient when the targeted misbehavior is known in advance
(at system design) and powerful statistical algorithms can be
used [4].
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use a reputation system [3]. Every node calculates the reputa-
tion of every other node using its own rst hand observations
and second hand information obtained from others. The repu-
tation of a node is used to determine whether countermeasures
against the node are undertaken or not. A key aspect of the
reputation system is how second hand information is used, in
order to avoid false accusations [3].
The countermeasures against a misbehaving node are aimed
at isolating it, i.e., packets will not be sent over the node
and packets sent from the node will be ignored. In this way
nodes are stimulated to cooperate in order to get service and
maximize their utility, and the network also benets from the
cooperation.
Even if not presented by its authors as an articial immune
system, the reputation system in [3], [4] is an example of
a (non-bio inspired) immune system. It contains interactions
between its healthy elements (well behaving nodes) and de-
tection and exclusion reactions against non-healthy elements
(misbehaving nodes). We can compare it to the natural innate
immune system (Section II-B), in the sense that it is hardwired
in the nodes and changes only with new versions of the
protocol.
Traditional approaches miss the ability to learn about and
adapt to new misbehavior. Every targeted misbehavior has
to be imagined in advanced and explicitly addressed in the
detection system. This is our motivation for using an articial
immune system approach.
C. Articial Immune System (AIS) Approaches
An AIS uses an analogy with the natural Immune System
(IS) of vertebrates. As a rst approximation, the IS can be
described with the self-nonself model, as follows (we give
more details in Section II-B).
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Fig. 1. From the natural IS to an AIS: Making DSR immune to node
misbehavior.
The IS is thought to be able to classify cells that are present
in the body as self and non-self cells. The IS is made of two
distinct sets of components: the innate IS, and the adaptive
IS. The innate IS is hard-wired to detect (and destroy) nonself
cells that contain, or do not contain, specic patterns on their
surface.
The adaptive IS is more complex. It produces a large
number of randomly created detectors. A negative selection
mechanism eliminates detectors that match any cell present in
a protected environment (bone marrow and the thymus) where
only self cells are assumed to be present. Non-eliminated
detectors become naive detectors; they die after some time,
unless they match something (assumed to be a pathogen),
in which case they become memory cells. Further, detectors
that do match a pathogen are quickly multiplied (clonal
selection); this is used to accelerate the response to further
attacks. Also, since the clones are not exact replicates, (they
are mutated, and mutation rate is an increasing function of
afnity between detectors and the pathogen) this provides a
more focused response to the pathogen (afnity maturation).
This also provides adaptation to a changing non-self environ-
ment.
The self-nonself model is only a very crude approximation
of the adaptive IS. Another important aspect is the danger
signal model [12], [13]. With this model, matching by the
innate or adaptive mechanism is not sufcient to cause detec-
tion; an additional danger signal is required. The danger signal
is for example generated by a cell that dies before being old.
The danger signal model better explains how the IS adapts not
only to a changing non-self, but also to some changes in self.
There are many more aspects to the IS, some of which are not
yet fully understood (see Section II-B).
D. Articial Immune Systems - Related Work
Hofmeyer and Forrest use an AIS for intrusion detection
in wired local area networks [6], [7]. Their work is based
on the negative selection part of the self-nonself model and
some form of danger signal. TCP connections play the role
of self and nonself cells. One connection is represented by a
triplet encoding the sender’s destination address, the receiver’s
destination address and the receiver’s port number. A detector
is a bit sequence of the same length as the triplet. A detector
matches a triplet if both have M contiguous equal bits, where
M is a xed system parameter. Candidate detectors are gener-
ated randomly; in a learning phase, detectors that match any
correct (i.e. self) triplets are eliminated. This is done ofine,
by presenting only correct TCP connections. Non-eliminated
detectors have a nite lifetime and die unless they match a non-
self triplet, as in the IS. The danger signal is also used: it is
sent by humans as conrmation in case of potential detection.
This is a drawback, since human intervention is required to
eliminate false positives, but it allows the system to learn
changes in the self. With the terminology of statistical pattern
classication, this use of the danger signal can be viewed as
some form of supervised training. Similarly, Dasgupta and
Gonz·alez [21] use an AIS approach to intrusion detection,
based on negative selection and genetic algorithms.
A major difculty in building an articial immune system
in our framework is the mapping from biological concepts
to computer network elements. Kim and Bentley show that
straightforward mappings have computational problems and
lead to poor performance, and they introduce a more efcient
representation of self and nonself than in [6]. They show
the computational weakness of negative selection and add
clonal selection to address this problem [9]. In their subsequent
papers, they examine clonal selection with negative selection
as an operator [10], and dynamical clonal selection [11],
showing how different parameters impact detection results. For
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[20] and the paper by de Castro and von Zuben [19].
In our previous work on building an AIS for misbehavior
detection in mobile ad-hoc networks [5] we implemented
negative selection. Negative selection is used for learning
about the protected system, but it does not provide adaptation
to misbehavior. In this work we also implement adaptation,
using clonal selection inspired by [10]. Clonal selection pro-
vides a faster secondary response to repeated misbehavior, as
discussed in Section Section I-A.
E. Contribution of this Paper and Organization
Our long term goal is to understand whether our previous
work, based on the traditional approach [2], can benet
from an AIS approach that introduces learning and adapting
mechanisms. In the DSR example, this means adding immune
system code to every node, so that it becomes resistant to other
nodes’ misbehavior.
The rst problem to solve is mapping the natural IS con-
cepts to our framework. This is a key issue that strongly
inuences the detection capabilities. We describe our solution
in Section III-B. For the representation of self-nonself and for
the matching functions, we start from the general structure
proposed by Kim and Bentley [9], which we adapt to our
case. Then we dene the resulting algorithm, which is based on
negative selection, clonal selection and an ad-hoc classication
rule. Our main contribution is the denition of a mapping and a
construction of an AIS adapted to our case, its implementation
in the Glomosim simulator, and its performance analysis. We
examine in more detail the effects of clonal selection and show
its positive impact on the secondary response time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives
background and terminology on DSR and the natural immune
system. Section III gives the mapping from the IS to the detec-
tion system for DSR misbehavior detection, and the detailed
denition of the detection system. Section IV gives simulation
specic assumptions and constraints, simulation results and
discussion of the results. Section V draws conclusions and
describes what we have learned and how we will exploit it in
future steps.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DSR: basic operations
DSR is one of the candidate standards for routing in mobile
ad hoc networks [17]. A source route is a list of nodes that
can be used as intermediate relays to reach a destination. It is
written in the data packet header at the source; intermediate
relays simply look it up to determine the next hop.
DSR species how sources discover, maintain and use
source routes. To discover a source route, a node broadcasts
a route request packet. Nodes that receive a route request,
add their own address in the source route collecting eld of
the packet, and then broadcast the packet, except in two cases.
The rst case is if the same route request was already received
by a node; then the node discards the packet. Two received
route requests are considered to be the same if they belong
to the same route discovery, which is identied by the same
value of source, destination and sequence number elds in the
request packets. The second case is if the receiving node is
destination of the route discovery, or if it already has a route
to the destination in its cache; then the node sends a route
reply message that contains a completed source route. If links
in the network are bidirectional, the route replies are sent over
the reversed collected routes. If links are not bidirectional, the
route replies are sent to the initiator of the route discovery as
included in a new route request generated by answering nodes.
The new route requests will have the destination be the source
of the initial route request. The node that initiates an original
route request gets usually more route replies, every containing
a different route. The replies that arrive earlier than others are
expected to indicate better routes, because for a node to send
a route reply, it is required to wait rst for a time proportional
to the number of hops in the route it has as the answer. If
a node hears that some neighbor node answers during this
waiting time, it supposes that the route it has is worse then
the neighbor’s one, and it does not answer. This avoids route
reply storms and unnecessary overhead.
After the initiator of route discovery gets a rst route reply,
it sends data over the obtained route. While packets are sent
over the route, the route is maintained, in such a way that every
node on the route is responsible for the link over which it sends
packets. If some link in the route breaks, the node that detects
that it cannot send over that link should send error messages to
the source. Additionally it should salvage the packets destined
to the broken link, i.e., re-route them over alternate partial
routes to the destination.
The mechanisms just described are the basic operation of
DSR. There are also some additional mechanisms, such as
gratuitous route replies, caching routes from forwarded or
overheard packets and DSR ow state extension [17].
B. The Natural Immune System
The main function of the IS is to protect the body against
different types of pathogens, such as viruses, bacteria and
parasites and to clear it from debris. It consists of a large
number of different innate and acquired immune cells, which
interact in order to provide detection and elimination of the
attackers [14]. We present a short overview based on the self-
nonself and the danger models [14], [13].
1) Functional architecture of the IS: The rst line of
defense of the body consists of physical barriers: skin and
mucous membranes of the digestive, respiratory and repro-
ductive tracts. It prevents the body from being entered easily
by pathogens.
The innate immune system is the second line of defense. It
protects the body against common bacteria, worms and some
viruses, and clears it from debris. It also interacts with the
adaptive immune system, signaling the presence of damage in
self cells and activating the adaptive IS.
The adaptive immune system learns about invaders and
tunes it’s detection mechanisms to better match previously
unknown pathogens. It provides an effective protection against
viruses even after they enter the body cells. It adapts to newly
encountered viruses and memorizes them for more efcient
and fast detection in the future.
42) The innate immune system: consists of macrophages
cells, complement proteins and natural killer cells.
Macrophages are big cells that are attracted by bacteria
to engulf the bacteria in the process called phagocytosis.
Complement proteins can also destroy some common bacteria.
Both macrophages and complement proteins send signals to
other immune cells when there is an attack.
3) The adaptive immune system: consists of two main types
of lymphocyte cells. These are B cells and T cells. Both
B and T cells are covered with antibodies. Antibodies are
proteins capable of chemically binding to nonself antigens.
Antigens are proteins that cover the surface of self and
nonself cells. Whether chemical binding takes place between
an antibody and an antigen depends on the complementarity
of their three-dimensional chemical structures. If it does, the
antigen and the antibody are said to be cognate. Because
this complementarity does not have to be exact, an antibody
may have several different cognate antigens. What happens
after binding depends on additional control signals exchanged
between different IS cells, as we explain next.
One B cell is covered by only one type of antibody, but
two B cells may have very different antibodies. As there are
many B cells (about 1 billion fresh cells are created daily
by a healthy human), there is also a large number of different
antibodies at the same time. How is this diversity of antibodies
created and why do antibodies not match self antigens ? The
answer is in the process of creating B cells. B cells are created
from stem cells in the bone marrow by rearrangement of genes
in immature B cells. Stem cells are generic cells from which
all immune cells derive. Rearrangement of genes provides
diversity of B cells. Before leaving bone marrow, B cells have
to survive negative selection: if the antibodies of a B cell
match any self antigen present in the bone marrow during this
phase, the cell dies. The cells that survive are likely to be self
tolerant.
B cells are not fully self tolerant, because not all self
antigens are presented in bone marrow. Self tolerance is
provided by T cells that are created in the same way as B cells,
but in the thymus, the organ behind the breastbone. T cells are
self tolerant because almost all self antigens are presented to
these cells during negative selection in the thymus.
After some antibodies of a B cell match antigens of a
pathogen or self cell (we call this event signal 1b) that
antigens are processed and presented on the surface of the
B cell. For this, Major-Histocompatibility-Complex (MHC)
molecules are used and their only function. If antibodies of
some T cell bind to these antigens and if the T cell is activated
(by some additional control signal) the detection is veried and
a conrmation signal sent from T cell to B cell (we call this
event signal 2b). Signal 2b starts the process of producing
new B cells, that will be able to match the pathogen better.
This process is called clonal selection. If signal 2b is absent,
it means that the detected antigens are probably self antigens
for which the T cells are tolerant. In this last case, the B cell
will die together with its self reactive antibodies.
B cells can begin clonal selection without conrmation by
signal 2b, but only in the case when matching between B
cell antibodies and antigens is very strong. This occurs with a
high probability only for memory B cells, the cells that were
veried in the past to match nonself antigens.
In the clonal selection phase, a B cell divides into a number
of clones with similar but not strictly identical antibodies.
Statistically, some clones will match the pathogen that trig-
gered the clonal selection better than the original B cells and
some will match it worse. If the pathogens whose antigens
triggered clonal selection are still present, they will continue
to trigger cloning new B cells that match the pathogen well.
The process continues reproducing B cells more and more
specic to present pathogens. B cells that are specic enough
become memory B cells and do not need co-stimulation by
signal 2b. This is a process with positive feedback and it
produces a large number of B cells specic to the presented
pathogen. Additionally, B cells secrete chemicals that neutral-
ize pathogens. The process stops when pathogens are cleared
from the body. Debris produced by the process are cleared by
the innate immune system. Memory B cells live long and they
are ready to react promptly to the same cognate pathogen in
the future. Whereas rst time encountered pathogens require a
few weeks to be learned and cleared by the IS, the secondary
reaction by memory B cells takes usually only a few days.
4) The Danger Signal: is an additional control used for
activating T cells. After T cell antibodies bind to antigens
presented by MHC of a B cell (signal 1t), the T cell is activated
and sends signal 2b to a B cell only if it receives a conrmation
signal (signal 2t) from an Antigen Presenting Cell (APC). The
APC will give signal 2t to a T cell only if it engulfed the same
nonself antigens, which happens only when the APC receive
a danger signal from self cells or from the innate immune
system. The danger signal is generated when there is some
damage to self cells, which is usually due to pathogens. As
an example, the danger signal is generated when a cell dies
before being old; the cell debris are different when a cell dies
of old age or when it is killed by a pathogen.
There are many other subtle mechanisms in the IS, and
not all of them are fully understood. In particular, time
constants of the regulation system (lifetime of B and T cells,
probability of reproduction) seem to play an important role in
the performance of the IS [15]. We expect that we have to
tune similar parameters carefully in an AIS.
III. DESIGN OF OUR DETECTION SYSTEM
A. Overview of Detection System
Every DSR node implements an instance of the detection
system, and runs it in two phases. In an initial phase, the
detection system learns about normal behavior of the nodes
with respect to the DSR protocol. During this phase, the node
is supposed to be in a protected environment in which all
nodes behave well. From received or overheard packets, the
node observes the behavior of its neighbors and represent it by
the antigens (Section III-C). At the end of this learning phase,
the nodes runs the negative selection process and creates its
antibodies, which we call detectors (Section III-C). In general
terms, the rst phase implements a special form of supervised
learning, where only positive cases are used for training.
After the learning is done, the node may leave the protected
environment and enter the second phase where detection and
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to misbehaving nodes. Detectors are used for checking if
newly collected antigens represent the behavior of good or
bad nodes. If an antigen, created for some neighbor during
some time interval, is detected by any of the detectors, the
neighbor is considered to be suspicious in that time interval.
If there are relatively many suspicious intervals for some
node, that node is classied as misbehaving (Section III-D).
In the node that did detection, this classication event triggers
the clonal selection process (Section III-E). In this process
the node adapts its detectors to better detect experienced
misbehavior. This results in a better response if the same or
similar misbehavior is encountered again. In general terms, the
second phase implements a form of re-enforcement learning.
The detailed algorithm is given in appendix.
B. Mapping of Natural IS Elements to Our Detection System
The elements of the natural IS used in our detection system
are mapped as follows:
• Body: the entire mobile ad-hoc network
• Self Cells: well behaving nodes
• Nonself Cells: misbehaving nodes
• Antigen: Sequence of observed DSR protocol events
recognized in sequence of packet headers. Examples of
events are data packet sent, data packet received,
data packet received followed by data packet sent,
route request packet received followed by route reply
sent. The sequence is mapped to a compact representa-
tion as explained in Section III-C.
• Antibody: a pattern with the same format as the compact
representation of antigen (Section III-C).
• Chemical Binding: binding of antibody to antigen is
mapped to a matching function, as explained in Sec-
tion III-C.
• Bone Marrow: Antibodies are created during an ofine
learning phase. The bone marrow (protected environment)
is mapped to a network with only certied nodes. In
a deployed system this would be a testbed with nodes
deployed by an operator; in our simulation environment,
this is a preliminary simulation phase.
C. Antigen, Antibody and Negative Selection
1) Antigens: Antigens could be represented as traces of
observed protocol events. However, even in low bit rate
networks, this rapidly generates sequences that are very long
(for a 100 seconds observation interval, a single sequence may
be up to 1 Gbit long), thus causing generation a large number
of patterns prohibitive. This was recognized and analyzed by
Kim and Bentley in [9] and we follow the conclusions, which
we adapt to our case, as we describe now.
A node in our system monitors its neighbors and collects
one protocol trace per monitored neighbor. A protocol trace
consists of a series of data sets, collected on non-overlapping
intervals during the activity time of a monitored neighbor. One
data set consists of events recorded during one time interval
of duration ∆t (∆t = 10s by default), with an additional
constraint to maximum Ns events per a data set (Ns = 40 by
default).
Data sets are then transformed as follows. First, protocol
events are mapped to a nite set of primitives, identied with
labels. In the simulation, we use the following list:
A= RREQ sent
B= RREP sent
C= RERR sent
D= DATA sent and IP source address
is not of monitored node
E= RREQ received
F= RREP received
G= RERR received
H= DATA received and IP destination address
is not of the monitored node
A data set is then represented as a sequence of labels from
the alphabet dened above, for example
l1 = (EAFBHHEDEBHDHDHHDHD,..)
Second, a number of genes are dened. A gene is an atomic
pattern used for matching. We use the following list:
Gene1= #E in sequence
Gene2= #(E*(A or B)) in sequence
Gene3= #H in sequence
Gene4= #(H*D) in sequence
where #(’sub-pattern’) is the number of the sub-patterns ’sub-
pattern’ in a sequence, with * representing one arbitrary label
or no label at all. For example, #(E*(A or B)) is the number
of sub-patterns that are two or three labels long, and that begin
with E and end with A or B. The genes are used to map a
sequence such as l1 to an intermediate representation that gives
the values of the different genes in one data set. For example,
l1 is mapped to an antigen that consists of the following four
genes:
l2 =
(
3 2 7 6
)
Finally, a gene value is encoded on 10 bits as follows. A
range of the values of a gene, that are bellow some threshold
value, is uniformly divided on 10 intervals. The position of the
interval to whom the gene value belongs gives the position of
the bit that is set to 1 for the gene in the nal representation.
The threshold is expected to be reached or exceeded rarely.
The values above the threshold are encoded as if they belong
to the last interval. Other bits are set to 0. For example, if the
threshold value for all the four dened genes is equal to 20,
l2 is mapped to the nal antigen format:
l3 =
(
0000000010 0000000010 0000001000 0000001000
)
There is one antigen such as l3 every ∆t seconds, for every
monitored node, during the activity time of the monitored
node. Every bit in this representation is called a nucleotide.
2) Antibody and Matching Function.: Antibodies have the
same format as antigens (such as l3), except that they may have
any number of nucleotides equal to 1 (whereas an antigen has
exactly one per gene). An antibody matches an antigen (i.e.
they are cognate) if the antibody has a 1 in every position
where the antigen has a 1. This is the same as in [10] and is
6advocated there as a method that allows a detection system to
have good coverage of a large set of possible nonself antigens
with a relatively small number of antibodies.
The genes are dened with the intention to translate raw
protocol sequences into more meaningful descriptions.
3) Negative Selection: Antibodies are created randomly,
uniformly over the set of possible antibodies. During the
ofine learning phase, antibodies that match any self antigen
are discarded (negative selection).
D. Node Detection and Classication
Matching an antigen is not enough to decide that the mon-
itored node misbehaves, since we expect, as in any AIS, that
false positives occur. Therefore, we make a distinction between
detection and classication. We say that a monitored node is
detected (or suspicious) in one data set (i.e. in one interval
of duration ∆t) if the corresponding antigen is matching any
antibody. Detection is done per interval of duration ∆t (=10s
by default). A monitored node is classified as “misbehaving”
if the probability that the node is suspicious, estimated over
a sufciently large number of data sets, is above a threshold.
The threshold is computed as follows.
Assume we have processed n data sets for this monitored
node. Let Mn be the number of data sets (among n) for which
this node is detected (i.e. is suspicious). Let θmax be a bound
on the probability of false positive detection (detection of well
behaving nodes, as if they are misbehaving) that we are willing
to accept, i.e. we consider that a node that is detected with
a probability ≤ θmax is a correct node (we take by default
θmax = 0.06). Let α (=0.0001 by default) be the classication
error that we we target. We classify the monitored node as
misbehaving if
Mn
n
> θmax(1 +
ξ(α)√
n
√
1− θmax
θmax
) (1)
where ξ(α) is the (1− α)-quantile of the normal distribution
(for example, ξ(0.0001) = 3.72). As long as Equation (1) is
not true, the node is classied as well behaving. With default
parameter values, the condition is Mn
n
> 0.06+0.88 ξ(α)√
n
. The
derivation of Equation (1) is given in the appendix.
E. Clonal Selection
As explained in Section II-B, the antibodies in the IS that
are activated by both signal 1b and signal 2b are selected to
undergo clonal selection. We dene signals 1b and 2b in our
setting as follows.
Signal 1b. When a misbehaving node is classied as misbe-
having (Section III-D), signal 1b is received by the detectors
that made the best scores in detecting that node.
Signal 2b. We do not implement an exact analog to signal
2b. This is because we do not model helper T-cells (these cells
generate signal 2b in the IS) and their activation (Section II-
B). Instead, we use a negative selection method, as in [10],
dened later in this section, to control the clonal selection
process once it starts. Passing the negative selection test by a
mutated antibody may be seen as the equivalent of receiving
some type of signal 2b, as it ensures self-tolerance. Indeed, one
important function of helper T-cells is providing self-tolerance.
The clonal selection mechanism with negative selection
works as follows. A fraction W (by default 15%) of the
best scored detectors of the node that receive signal 1b
enter the clonal selection process, in which each of them
will produce one new additional detector. Every detector that
enters the process is cloned; the clone is mutated, and if it
matches some of the self-antigens in the node’s collection, it
is eliminated (negative selection test). This is repeated until
one mutated clone is generated that survives the negative
selection test. Mutation is dened as random ipping bits of
the detector, which occurs with some small probability p (by
default 0.1). The newly generated detectors are substituted to
the same number of this node’s detectors; the detectors that
had the worse score in the detection of misbehaving node that
triggered the process are eliminated.
For example, let d be a node’s detector that is selected to
undergo clonal selection. A possible clonal selection process
scenario is as follows.
d =
(
1100010110 1110110010 0010100000 1000001101
)
From the set (S) of self antigens that the node has collected
during the learning phase, let a1 and a2 are two examples:
a1 =
(
0000000010 0000000010 0000001000 0000000100
)
a2 =
(
0000000010 0000000010 0000001000 0000001000
)
We see that d does not match a1 or a2 (the matching rule is
given in Section III-C.2); it does not match any of the antigens
from S, by the rule how it is generated. Let d1 be the rst
mutated clone of d, which happens to differ from d in 3 bits:
d1 =
(
1100010110 1110110011 0010101000 1000001001
)
Because d1 matches a2, d1 is deleted and another mutated
clone d2 is created, which happens to differ from d in 4 bits:
d2 =
(
1100010110 1100110010 0011100000 0000011101
)
We see that d2 does not match a1 or a2, and assuming that it
does not match any other antigen from the set S, d2 becomes
a valid detector, and will substitute a badly scored one from
the set S.
Because the length of the detectors is 40 bits and the
mutation probability per bit is 0.1, mutated clones will differ
from original detectors from which they are created in 4 bits in
average, before negative selection. When detectors are created
in learning phase they differ in average in 20 bits before
negative selection. This means that clonal selection increases
the percentage of the detectors that are similar but slightly
different to good scored ones. It is intuitively clear from these
facts, and is conrmed by the experiments, that the clonal
selection improves the detection results.
F. System Parameters
In this implementation, the default values of parameters
(Table I) are chosen from extensive pilot simulation runs, as
a compromise between good detection results and a small
memory and computation usage by the detection system.
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DETECTION SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Parameters Default values
maximal number of self antigens collected for learning 450
maximal time for collecting self antigens for learning 200 s
number of detectors 300
number of genes in an antigen 4
number of nucleotides per gene 10
max. number of protocol events recorded in a data set 40
maximal time for collecting a data set (an antigen) 10 s
accepted misbehavior threshold θmax 0.06
targeted classification error ratio α 0.0001
percentage of detectors selected for clonal selection 0.15
probability of mutation per bit 0.1
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Description of Simulation
1) Experimental Setup: We have implemented our detec-
tion system in Glomosim [16], a simulation environment for
mobile ad-hoc networks. We use the simulator’s DSR code
and modify it only to allow nodes’ misbehavior. The detection
system code that we add can be run in two versions: with or
without clonal selection mechanism.
We simulate a network of 40 nodes. The simulation area is
a rectangle with the dimensions of 800 m x 600 m. The nodes
are initially deployed on a grid with the distance between
neighbors equal to 100 m. The mobility model is random way-
point. The speed of nodes is a parameter, and we set it to be
constant for one simulation run. The radio range is 380 m.
Trafc is generated as constant bit-rate, with packets of length
512 bytes sent every 0.2-1 s.
We run two series of experiments:
• (Without clonal selection:) In the rst set of experiments,
clonal selection is disabled. The initial set of detectors
generated during the learning phase is used unchanged
during the detection and classication phase.
• (With clonal selection:) Then we run a second set of
experiments, now with clonal selection. Every experiment
consists of four consecutive phases, in order to obtain pri-
mary and secondary responses. The rst phase is learning
an initial set of detectors (as in the rst experiment). The
second phase is detection and classication, but now the
detectors start to change and adapt to misbehavior during
the phase. This allows us to measure the primary response
metrics. In the third phase, nodes do not misbehave, and
the system forgets about previous detections, but the set
of detectors obtained at the end of the second phase is
kept unchanged. The fourth phase is again a detection
and classication phase, with the same misbehavior as in
the second phase, but the initial set of detectors is now
different (it is the set that is achieved at the end of the
second phase). This gives the secondary response metrics.
The conditions are otherwise the same as in the rst set
of experiments.
We performed 20 independent replications of all experi-
ments, in order to obtain good 90% condence intervals.
For all the simulations, the parameters have the default
values (Table I), unless otherwise mentioned.
2) Misbehavior: is implemented by a modifying the DSR
implementation in Glomosim. We implemented two types
of misbehavior: (1) non-forwarding route requests and non-
answering from its route cache and (2) non-forwarding data
packets. A misbehaving node does not misbehave for every
packet. In contrast, it does so with xed probabilities, which
are also simulation parameters (default values are 0.6). In our
implementation, a node is able to misbehave with different
probabilities for the two types of misbehavior. In the simula-
tion we always set both misbehavior probabilities to the same
value (what is not necessary). The number of misbehaving
nodes is also a simulation parameter (default value is 5).
3) Performance Metrics: We show simulation results with
the following metrics:
Average Time until Correct Classification: the time until a
given node, that is running the detection algorithm, classies a
given misbehaving node as misbehaving for the rst time (after
a sufciently large number of positive detections occurred,
see Equation (1)), averaged over all pairs 〈node i that is
running the detection algorithm, node j that is classied as
misbehaving by node i〉. When we talk about “response time”
of the detection system, we refer to this metric.
True Positive Classification Ratio: the percentage of misbe-
having nodes that are classied as misbehaving.
False Positive Classification Ratio: the percentage of well
behaving nodes that are mistakenly classied as misbehaving.
B. Simulation results
1) Classication capabilities: For all simulation runs, all
misbehaving nodes are detected and classied as misbehaving
by all their neighbors in the static case and by all nodes in
the cases with mobility. The main effect on other classication
metrics is by the parameter α, the classication error tolerance
(Figure 2). By decreasing the value of α, the false positive
classication ratio decreases quickly to very small values,
below the value 0.002 (Figure 2(a)), causing a relatively small
increase in the time needed for true positive classication
(Figure 2(b)). This indicates that it is possible to choose α
in the order of 0.0001 and obtain both a very small value of
false classication ratio and a small time until classication.
2) Impact of clonal selection: Clonal selection has a signi-
cant effect on the secondary response time, which is decreased
by a factor 3−4 (Figure 2(b)). The false positive classication
ratio is also decreased a little (Figure 2(b)). Another positive
effect of clonal selection is a slight decrease in primary
response time (Figure 2(b), Figure 3). This slight decrease
is more pronounced when the number of misbehaving nodes
is large. This is because it is likely that a node that sees
a specic misbehaving node for the rst time was already
exposed to other misbehaving nodes before. If there is only
one misbehaving node, this effect does not occur (Figure 3(a)).
3) Effect of other parameters: Figure 3 shows that param-
eters other than α have a limited effect on the time until
classication. The effect of these parameters on the false
positive classication ratio is even smaller. The values of
obtained false positive classication ratios vary in the very
small range between 0.001 and 0.003 (as mainly determined
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Fig. 2. The AIS main metrics: (a) Average ratio of misclassification for well behaving nodes (false positive) and (b) average time until correct classification
for misbehaving nodes versus target false positive classification probability α, for tree cases: without clonal selection (CS), with CS-primary response, with
CS-secondary response. Comment: true positive classification ratio is equal to 1, what is not shown on the graphs.
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Fig. 3. Behavior of the detection system with parameters change: Time until true positive classification with respect to: (a) number of misbehaving nodes; (b)
misbehavior probability; (c) speed of nodes. In all cases target misclassification probability parameter α is set 0.0001. We do not put obtained false positive
ratios on the graphs, because they vary in the vary small range between 0.001 and 0.003.
by the value of the parameter α (α = 0.0001)) and this is the
reason we do not show them on the graphs.
V. CONCLUSIONS
1) Results obtained so far: We have designed a method to
apply an articial immune system approach for misbehavior
detection in a mobile ad-hoc network. Our simulations show
good detection capabilities and the effectiveness of clonal
selection at providing an accelerated secondary response. As
explained in Section I-D, a quick secondary response is of
special importance in the case of our protected system.
2) Lessons learned and Future Work: In this early phase,
it is premature to draw general purpose conclusions about the
performance of the AIS approach. We need more experiments
to extend our initial work to more misbehavior and trafc
patterns. Instead, we would like to focus now on what the
experience of designing this rst phase tells us for the future.
3) Mapping IS to AIS: The most difcult problem we
encountered was the mapping from the IS to the concrete
problem of DSR misbehavior detection. We have followed the
approaches in [6], [8] but a large number of fundamental issues
remain unclear. At the highest level, we still wonder what is
the best choice for a target unit to be detected: the node, or
sequence of messages, or a message itself. This choice could
have impact on the design challenges and possible use of the
detection system. Even if we stay with the mapping we have
designed here, questions remain vastly open.
The very denition of genes is one of them. We have
dened them in an ad-hoc way, trying to guess the denitions
that would have the best detection capabilities. We made
sure to have at least two correlated genes per misbehavior,
in order to capture it efciently. Indeed, we propose to use
the correlation between genes as an important criterion in
selecting the genes dened in the antigen structure. In a next
phase, we are planning to automate the process of selecting
genes. Correlation between genes from an offered set of
genes can be computed from experimental data in a normal
operation of the network without misbehaving nodes. Good
pairs, triples or k-tuples of genes, which score high cross-
correlation, can be selected automatically. The nal selection
of candidate genes would still require to be screened by a
human expert intervention, but this would be considerably
simpler than designing genes from scratch, as we did. One
can observe that such a gene selection process is not part of
the natural IS, but one can view it as an accelerated selection
process. An alternative is to dene genes as arbitrary low
level bit patterns, and let negative and clonal selection do
the job of keeping only the relevant antibodies. This would
be more in line with the original motivation for using an
AIS. A problem with this approach is that it would require
many genes, and the processing effort needed to generate good
detectors increases exponentially with the number of genes.
A possible angle of attack is based on the observation that
the IS is also a resource management system. Indeed, the
IS has mechanisms to multiply IS cells and send them to
9the parts of the body under attack, thus mobilizing resources
where and when needed. An analogy here would be to use
randomization: in a steady state, only a small, random subset
of protocol event sequences is used to create antigens. When
an attack is on (signalled by a danger signal, see below), more
events are analyzed in the regions that are in danger. In another
direction, the response against a specic attack can depend on
the intensity of the detection [22].
4) Innate System and Danger Signal: The model we im-
plemented in this rst step could be fortied with the addi-
tional mechanisms of the danger signals [13]. i.e. the signal
that controls activation of helper T-cells (the danger signal
(Section II-B). Danger signals could be dened as network
performance indicators (packet loss, delay). In the natural IS,
the danger signal is intimately linked to the innate system.
Here, the innate system could be mapped to the traditional
approach, i.e. a set of pre-dened detection mechanisms as
we developed in [4]. It is likely that many new attacks will
be accompanied with symptoms that are not new. Thus the
innate system could be used as a source of the danger signal as
well. This would free resources to focus the adaptive immune
system on the detection of truly new, unexpected misbehavior.
5) Regulation: The translation of non-self antigen matching
to misbehaviour detection is done in a classical, statistical way.
This should be compared to the regulation of B-cell and T-cell
clonal division [15], which is algorithmically very different.
6) Parameter Tuning: Even if an appropriate mapping of
IS to AIS is found, it remains that the performance is very
sensitive to some parameters; the parameters have to be
carefully tuned. It is unclear today whether this dependency
exists in the IS, and if natural selection takes care of choosing
good values, or whether there are inherently stable control
mechanisms in the IS that make accurate tuning less important.
Understanding this is key to designing not only an AIS as we
do here, but also a large class of controlled systems.
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APPENDIX
DETAILED ALGORITHM
Here is the detailed detection and classication algorithm
that is executed in a node:
//learning or detection and classifying phase
//may be chosen online;
//clonal selection may be enabled or desbled online;
//for this an interface to the program exist
//through ’phase’ and ’isClonalSelEnabled’ variables
//
phase=readPhase();
isClonalSelEnabled=readIsCSEnabled();
switch(phase){
case LEARNING{
phaseTimer=maximalLearningTime;
numberOfCollectedDataSets=0;
collectingDataSetsTimer=0;
SetOfDetectors=
CreateAnEmptyOrEmptyItIfExistsSetOfDetectors();
numberOfDetectors=0;
while(phase==LEARNING){
if(aPacketSentReceivedOrOverheared){
createOrUpdateNeighborsList();
if(collectingDataSetsTimer==0 &&
numberOfCollectedDataSets<maxNumOfCSD){
openNewCollectingDataSets();
collectingDataSetsTimer==deltaT;
}//end if
UpdateCurrentDataSetsIfTheyAreOpen();
}//end if
if(collectingDataSetsTimer==0){
closeCurrentCollectingDataSets();
}//end if
if(phase!=LEARNING) break;
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if(phaseTimer==0){
//create detectors by negative selection
setOfSelfAntigens=
createSelfAntigensFromCollectedDataSets();
while(numberOfDetectors<TargetedNumDet){
generateANewDetectorByRandom();
if(isNewDetMatchingAnySelfAntigen()){
deleteNewDetector();
}//end if
else{
addNewDetectorToSetOfDetectors();
numberOfDetectors++;
}//end if else
}//end while
phase=DETECTINGandCLASSIFYING;
}//end if
}// end while
break;
}//end case
case DETECTINGandCLASSIFYING{
//with clonal selection as option
if(!isSetOfDetectorsExists()){
phase=WRONGuSE
break;
}//end if
//previous line prevents entering this phase
//in case that learning is never done
deleteScoresOfDetectorsIfTheyExist();
deleteDetectionDataForObservedNodesIfTheyExists();
while(phase==DETECTINGandCLASSIFYING){
if(isPacketSentReceivedOrOverheared()){
createOrUpdateNeighborsList();
if(collectingDataSetsTimer==0 &&
numberOfCollectedDataSets<maxNumOfCSD){
openNewCollectingDataSets();
collectingDataSetsTimer==deltaT;
}//end if
UpdateCurrentDataSetsIfTheyAreOpen();
}//end if
if(phase!=DETECTINGandCLASSIFYING) break;
if(collectingDataSetsTimer==0){
//do detection and classification
createAntigensFromCurrentDataSets();
deleteCurrentDataSets();
checkAntigensFromLastDeltaTByDetectors();
updateListOfDetectedNodes();
updateDetectionResultsForObservedNodes();
updateDetectionScoresForDetectors();
deleteAntigensFromLastDeltaT();
checkDetectionResultsForClassification();
if(areNewNodesClassifiedAsMisbehaving()){
if(isClonalSelEnabled){
//do clonal selection
MisbNodes=
setOfNodesClassifedAsMisbInLastDeltaT();
N=enumerateElementsOf(MisbNodes);
for(i=1;i<=N;i++){
misbNode=takeElement#i(MisbNodes,i);
GoodScored=
findGoodScoredForNode(misbNode);
BedScored=
findBedScoredForNode(misbNode);
M=enumerateElementsOf(GoodScored);
for (j=1;j<=M;j++){
tmpDet=takeElement#j(GoodScored,j);
oldDet=takeElement#j(BadScored,j);
success=FALSE;
while(success=FALSE){
clone=makeClone(tmpDet);
mutateClone(clone);
isAnyMatching=
isMatching(clone,SetOfSelfAntigens);
if(isMatching)deleteNewClone();
else{
replaceOldByClone(oldDet,clone);
success=TRUE;
} //end if else
}//end while
}//end for
}//end for
}//end if
}//end if
}//end if
}//end while
break;
}//end CASE
case WRONGuSE{
//if detection and classification phase is
//started from the program interface and
//learning is not finished when last time
//started or learning is never started !
sendMessageToTheProgramInterfaceOnce();
//phase may be set from the program interface;
}//end case
}//end switch
